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The purpose of the article is to compare the American evidentiary rule of “state secrets 
privilege” with the Polish regulation of Article 248 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This issue,  
in particular, gains importance in the light of legal changes that occurred in the USA and most 
developed countries in the aftermath of the 11
th
 September 2001 attacks and the so-called  
“war against terrorism”. The author presents the genesis and evolution of the privilege, the history 
of its application, as well as doubts which it has aroused in terms of civil rights. The American 
solutions make up a point of reference for the Polish regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
A dogmatic analysis of Article 248 § 1 of the Code offers a broad platform for discussions about  
its compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well as, noted legal loopholes  
in the law of civil procedure, in connection with the protection of classified information. The author 
underlines the fact that, after the regime transformation in Poland, the right to information gained 
the status of a public subjective right, but it had a very little impact on the shape of the civil process. 
He points to the implications of the fact that Polish legislators departed from the principle  
of objective truth in the process, for the sake of the principle of formal truth, commonly accepted  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The subject developed refers to one of civil procedural law institutions. 
Because of the specificity of the subject of the regulation, the scope  
of presentation of this issue needs to go beyond the traditional field  
of procedural law. The question of the transparency of the actions of State 
authorities relates to a constitutional matter, as well as legal and political 
culture. For this reason, the comparison of the US evidentiary rule of “state 
secrets privilege” to Polish regulation of Article 248 § 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure1 is an interesting issue of comparative law. The subject gains  
a special significance against the background of the legal changes that have 
occurred in the US in the aftermath of 11th September 2001 attacks  
and the so-called “war on terror”. Shortly after taking office, Barack 
Obama, the US President, announced a new approach to the issue of open 
administration. In his memorandum of January 2009, he announced  
“an unprecedented level of government openness”2. Polish experience  
in this matter is equally dynamic and noteworthy. On the one hand,  
the regime transformation in Poland had it that the right to information 
gained the status of a public subjective right, on the other hand,  
the legislator departed from the principle of objective truth in the law  
of civil procedure, opting instead for the legal principle of formal truth 
commonly accepted in Western legal culture. 
 The seemingly ordinary evidentiary rule has its implications  
in the terms of the constitutional right to a fair trial, the right to public 
information, and also the issue of basing law on moral high grounds.  
The analysis of this matter may show how deep is the erosion  
of the community of political and legal values amongst European States 




                                                   
1 Act of 17.10.1964 Code of Civil Procedure, Dz.U. [Polish Journal of Laws] No. 43, item 296, 
as amended. 
2 Presidential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 
(21.01.2009). 
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STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE 
 
 The United States is a country with a long and rich constitutional 
tradition, including also the issue of making available to the public 
information crucial to the State. Although the principle of openness cannot 
be found in the catalogue of basic norms of the US Constitution, there  
are such standards stipulated therein, which, among other things, compel 
Congress to disclose to the public the object of its debates. The extension  
of this type of duties to other sectors of authorities was possible, owing  
to the law-making activity of the supreme and appellate courts. In recent 
years, openness has become a value particularly strongly accented  
at the political level. However, we cannot forget that the US axiological 
approach to European standards in this area must remain within  
the framework allowed by the directives for the interpretation  
of the United States Constitution. 
 American civil litigation is characterized by the wide availability  
of all information held by the parties and third parties. At the request  
of the parties, anybody uninvolved in the process shall file all documents 
held and related to the case. US law “tolerates secrecy before the court 
extremely reluctantly”3. 
 One of the reasons for derogations from the principle of openness  
and the accessibility of documentary evidence in civil procedure  
is the information autonomy of each government branch, stemming  
from the principle of the separation of powers. The American courts  
and the legislator have limited access to the executive power’s inside 
information (the so-called “executive privilege”)4. In judicial proceedings,  
                                                   
3 P. Schlosser, Problem wykrycia prawdy a prawo zachowania tajemnicy w procesie cywilnym 
Europy Zachodniej i USA [The Problem of the Search for Truth and the Right to Secrecy in Civil 
Proceedings in Western Europe and the US], Annales UMCS 1982, sec. G, vol. 29, p. 88. 
4 J.P. Carlin, Walker v. Cheney: Politics, Posturing, and Executive Privilege, Southern California 
Law Review 2002, vol. 76; K.A. Klukowski, Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor 
Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional Oversight, Cleveland State Law Review 2011, vol. 59; 
M.J. Rozell, M.A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the Bush Administration, Journal of Law 
& Politics 2008, vol. 24; A.K. Magid, The Negative Executive Privilege, Stanford Law & Policy 
Review 2009, vol. 20; M.W. Warnock, Stifling Gubernatorial Secrecy: Application of Executive 
Privilege to State Executive Officials, Capital University Law Review 2007, vol. 35; H. Kitrosser, 
Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, Iowa Law Review 2007, vol. 92;  
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the executive power may withhold disclosure of the information, if that 
information has a particular importance to national security. In the field  
of civil procedure the information autonomy of the executive power 
manifests itself in the form of the precedent evidential standard known  
as state secrets privilege5. Under the state secrets doctrine, the United States 
may prevent the disclosure of information in judicial proceedings if “there 
is a reasonable danger” that such disclosure will expose military matters  
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. Such  
a competence belongs exclusively to the government and therefore cannot 
be validly asserted by a private party in any civil litigation.  
 The precedent was established in the early 19th century6 but its first 
articulation in the modern analytical framework took place in 1953  
in the case United States v. Reynolds7. The matter of Reynolds was as follows. 
A B-29 bomber, testing a secret electronic equipment crashed, killing six 
crew members and three civilian observers. The widows of the deceased 
civilians brought action against the United States under the Tort Claims Act 
seeking the production of the Air Force’s official accident investigation 
report. The Air Force opposed disclosure of the required documents,  
as the aircraft and its occupants were engaged in a “highly secret mission 
of the Air Force” at the time of the crash. According to the government, 
disclosure of the requested materials would “seriously hamper national 
security, flying safety, and the development of highly technical and secret 
military equipment”8. The District Court ordered the Government  
to produce the documents in order that the court might determine whether 
they contained privileged matter. When the Air Force refused, the district 
court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence; the court  
of appeals subsequently affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
J. Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 
Maryland Law Review 2001, vol. 60. 
5 A. Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, Fordham Law Review 2007,  
vol. 75. 
6 One of the first references to it was in Aaron Burr’s treason trial from 1807 (U.S. v. Burr,  
25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.Va 1807); see also Ch.F. Hobson (ed.), The Aaron Burr Treason Trial, 
Washington: Federal Judicial Center 2006. 
7 United States v. Reynolds 345 U.S. 1 (1953), available at: https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/345/1/case.html [last accessed: 24.10.2015]. 
8 Ibidem. 
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Court reversed the decision and refined the application of the privilege  
by formalizing the procedural requirements for its invocation. The Court 
balanced national security matters with adherence to the rule of law  
and respect to the rights of individual litigants9. 
 There is a two-step procedure to be used when evaluating a claim  
of privilege to protect state secrets. First, “there must be a formal claim  
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over 
the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer”10. Second, 
“the court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate 
for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure  
of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect”11. 
 In Reynolds, the Court also observed that “in each case, the showing  
of necessity which is made so that the plaintiff may have access  
to the information will determine how far the court should probe  
in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate 
(…) but where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made 
under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail”12. The rule was 
specified in Ellsberg v. Mitchell from 198313. “When a litigant must lose  
if the claim is upheld and the government’s assertions are dubious in view 
of the nature of the information requested and the circumstances 
surrounding the case, careful in camera examination of the material  
is not only appropriate, but obligatory”14. 
 In the light of a successful claim of privilege, a court must decide either 
to dismiss a claim in its entirety or to allow the case to proceed with  
no consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence. The correct 
decision is highly dependent upon the specific facts of a case. In Reynolds, 
the Court did not dismiss the claim, but remanded it and instructed  
the district court to provide the plaintiffs with the opportunity to pursue 
                                                   
9 J. Kalajdzic, Litigating State Secrets: A Comparative Study of National Security Privilege  




13 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, availabe at: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/353/515 
/2344341/ [last accessed: 24.10.2015]. 
14 Ibidem. 
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their case without the privileged evidence. According to existing state 
secrets privilege jurisprudence the outright dismissal of a case usually 
takes place in three types of situations. The first is when a plaintiff cannot 
establish a prima facie case without the protected evidence. It means that  
the plaintiff cannot establish by the evidence he has at his disposal such  
a cause of action as to justify a verdict in his favour provided such evidence 
is not rebutted by the other party. Secondly, a case will also generally  
be dismissed where the privilege deprives a litigant of evidence necessary 
to establish a valid defence. The third situation that requires outright 
dismissal pursuant to the state secrets privilege is when the court 
determines that the “very subject matter of the case is a state secret”, and  
as a result, “litigating the case to a judgment on the merits would present 
an unacceptable risk of disclosing state secrets”15. 
 Invocation of the state secrets privilege is also possible even  
if the government is not itself a party to the suit in question. If the nature  
of the claim is such that the litigation could potentially lead  
to the disclosure of secret evidence, the government must itself intervene 
and assert the state secrets privilege. This possibility was confirmed  
in Ellsberg v. Mitchell from 198316. “The result is simply that the evidence  
is unavailable, as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed 
accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the loss  
of evidence”17. Asserting the privilege by a court has merely deprived  
the plaintiff of certain evidence. 
 State secrets privilege is usually considered as a common law 
evidentiary privilege18. In United States v. Nixon from 1974, the Court 
articulated the doctrine’s constitutional dimension, observing that the state 
secrets privilege provides exceptionally strong protection because  
it concerns “areas of Article II duties in which the courts have traditionally 
                                                   
15 T. Garvey, E.C. Liu, The State Secrets Privilege: Preventing the Disclosure of Sensitive  
National Security Information during Civil Litigation, CRS Report for Congress,  
Washington 2013, pp. 5-6. 
16 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 13. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 P. Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government Secrecy, Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 2013, vol. 48, no. 2. 
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shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities”19. Also  
in Ellsberg the court recognized concerns about the separation of powers: 
“[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated  
to the caprice of executive officers”20, but, as J.A. Crook observed “critical 
examination of the validity of the government’s claim of privilege 
necessarily required a difficult balance between the litigant’s need  
to present his case and the government’s need to protect the integrity  
of information related to national security”21. In the more recent El-Masri 
case, the court stated “although the state secrets privilege was developed  
at common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, 
because it allows the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy 
is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities”22. 
 In a post-9/11 world, the courts have found themselves faced with  
the challenge of hearing new cases, raising the issue of the state secrets 
privilege. The privilege arose mostly in cases concerning the government’s 
“extraordinary rendition” practices and challenges to the terrorist 
surveillance programme23. The war on terrorism has been leading  
to numerous lawsuits in which national security programmes have been 
implicated24. 
 The El-Masri case from 200725 might be used as an example. El-Masri 
was a German citizen of Lebanese descent. He alleged that he had been 
detained by Macedonian law enforcement officials in 2003 and then handed 
over to CIA operatives, who flew him to a CIA-operated detention facility 
in Afghanistan. He was held there against his will, but had also been 
mistreated in a number of other ways during his detention. El-Masri 
                                                   
19 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), availabe at: https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/418/683/case.html [last accessed: 24.10.2015]. 
20 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 13. 
21 J.A. Crook, From the Civil War to the War on Terror: The Evolution and Application  
of the State Secrets Privilege, Albany Law Review 2009, vol. 72, p. 64. 
22 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20070303_MASRI.pdf [last accessed: 
24.10.2015]. 
23 Garvey, Liu, supra note 15, p. 5. See also V. Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State 
Secrets Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, The North Carolina Journal of International 
Law & Commercial Regulation 2008, vol. 33. 
24 Kalajdzic, supra note 9, p. 209. 
25 El-Masri v. United States, supra note 22. 
84   |   Karol Dobrzeniecki  
alleged that his detention and interrogation should be qualified  
as an “extraordinary rendition”, which means “the clandestine abduction 
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected  
of involvement in terrorist activities, and their subsequent interrogation 
using methods impermissible under U.S. and international laws”26. 
 The United States interposed a claim of the state secrets privilege.  
The Director of the CIA explained why further court proceedings would 
create an unreasonable risk of disclosure of information, and spelled  
out why such disclosure would be detrimental to national security.  
El-Masri responded that the state secrets doctrine did not necessitate 
dismissal of his complaint, primarily because CIA rendition operations  
had been widely discussed in public forums.  
 The court resolved the matter by use of a three-part analysis. First,  
the court ascertained that the procedural requirements for invoking  
the state secrets privilege were satisfied. Second, the court decided that  
the information sought to be protected since it qualified as privileged 
under the state secrets doctrine. The ultimate question to be resolved  
was how the matter should proceed in the light of the successful  
privilege claim. Finally the court dismissed the proceeding because  
the circumstances made it clear that privileged information was so central 
to the litigation that any attempt to proceed would threaten disclosure  
of that information. 
 In El-Masri the court emphasized that “it is the court, not the executive, 
that determines whether the state secrets privilege has been properly 
invoked. In order to successfully claim the state secrets privilege,  
the executive must satisfy the court that disclosure of the information 
sought to be protected would expose matters that, in the interest of national 
security, ought to remain secret. Similarly, in order to win dismissal  
of an action on state secrets grounds, the executive must persuade the court 
that state secrets are so central to the action that it cannot be fairly litigated 
without threatening their disclosure. The state secrets privilege cannot  
be successfully interposed, nor can it lead to dismissal of an action, based 
                                                   
26 Ibidem. 
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merely on the executive’s assertion that the pertinent standard has  
been met”27. 
 Both in American jurisprudence and worldwide, El-Masri raised 
concerns about the limits of unchecked executive privilege and  
an individual’s right to judicial redress28. The privilege was said  
to be overused by the executive branch to prevent disclosure of its own 
questionable, embarrassing, or unlawful conduct – particularly with 
respect to the “war on terror”. It could also destabilize the balance between 
protecting legitimate government secrets and the right to judicial redress  
of wrongs29.  
 After a comprehensive analysis of relevant rulings in which state 
secrets privilege was invoked, Daniel J. Huyck made a following 
observation: “[b]ased on the government’s success in asserting the privilege 
and the post-9/11 desire for secrecy, there is a significant incentive  
to invoke the privilege as a blanket protection over every item of potential 
evidence (documents and witnesses) concerning the claim. This incentive 
has the potential of effectively barring the courthouse doors for those  
who have suffered fundamental harms by the government. For example, 
dismissing El-Masri’s claim based on the state secrets privilege blocks 
almost every formal channel for government accountability over  
the practice of «extraordinary rendition», and public accountability  
for any errors occurring within that program”30. 
                                                   
27 Ibidem. 
28 See B. Bernstein, Over before It Even Began: Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan and the Use  
of the State Secrets Privilege in Extraordinary Rendition Cases, Fordham International Law 
Journal 2011, vol. 34; E.E. Bohannon, Breaking the Silence: A Challenge to Executive Use  
of the State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss Claims of CIA Torture in Mohamed v. Jeppesen  
Dataplan, Inc., University of Miami Law Review 2011, vol. 65. 
29 See: Ch.D. Yamaoka, The State Secrets Privilege: What’s Wrong with It, How It Got that Way, 
and How the Courts Can Fix It, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 2007, vol. 37;  
M. Ziegler, Pay no Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: The Government’s Increased Use of the 
State Secrets Privilege to Conceal Wrongdoing, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 2008, vol. 23; 
H. Wells, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended Consequences, Arizona Law 
Review 2008, vol. 50; M.H. Page, Judging without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State 
Secrets Privilege Claims, Cornell Law Review 2008, vol. 93. 
30 D.J. Huyck, Fade to Black: El-Masri v. United States Validates the Use of the State Secrets 
Privilege to Dismiss “Extraordinary Rendition” Claims, Minnesota Journal of International  
Law 2008, vol. 17, p. 458. 
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 In view of mounting criticism, the administration of Barack Obama 
issued in September 2009 a new policy on the state secrets privilege  
in an attempt to ensure greater accountability in its assertion in litigation. 
According to the policy the privilege should be invoked only when 
necessary and in the narrowest way possible. The Attorney General’s 
memorandum for heads of executive departments and agencies31 outlined 
several aspects of the new administrative process that increase 
accountability and oversight. Assertion of the privilege in litigation should 
be defended only when it is necessary to protect information,  
the unauthorized disclosure of which could be reasonably expected  
to cause significant harm to the national defence or foreign relations  
of the United States. The privilege should also be invoked only to the extent 
necessary to protect the national security. The Attorney General declared 
that the privilege is not to be invoked in order to conceal violations  
of the law, inefficiency, or administrative error, or to prevent 
embarrassment to a person, an organization, or an agency of the United 
States government, or to restrain competition. The policy requires  
the personal approval of the Attorney General prior to the invocation  
of the state secret privilege as well as providing periodic reports  
on all cases in which the privilege is asserted to the appropriate oversight 
Committees in Congress. 
 In the United States, there is ongoing debate over the reform  
of the state secrets privilege32. Some scholars recommended that Congress 
create a code for the judiciary to follow in cases involving the privilege33.  
In 2008, two bills were advanced either in the House of Representatives  
                                                   
31 Attorney General Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege, 23.09.2009, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/09/23/state-secret-
privileges.pdf [last accessed: 24.10.2015]. 
32 A. Rapa, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of Justice and a Proposal  
to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, Seton Hall Law Review 2006, vol. 37; E. Simpson, “Nothing 
is so Oppressive as a Secret”: Recommendations for Reforming the State Secrets Privilege , Temple 
Law Review 2007, vol. 80; B. George, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State 
Secrets Privilege, New York University Law Review 2009, vol. 84; R. Glasionov, In Furtherance 
of Transparency and Litigants’ Rights: Reforming the State Secrets Privilege , The George 
Washington Law Review 2009, vol. 77.  
33 S.M. Ward, The State Secrets Protection Act: Statutory Reform of the State Secrets Privilege ,  
The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 2009, vol. 7; R.M. Chesney, Legislative Reform 
of the State Secrets Privilege, Roger Williams University Law Review 2008, vol. 15. 
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or in the Senate, attempting to impose more stringent conditions  
on the invocation of the privilege by the President and requiring  
the Attorney General to report to Congress on cases in which the executive 
had asserted the State secret privilege in court. Nevertheless, Congress 
declined to implement legislative limits to the privilege, preferring instead 
to allow the judiciary to determine the limits via case law. 
 A class of claims in which judicial process is inadmissible are cases 
arising from agreements on secret service. This rule was created  
in the judgment of Totten v. United States from 187634. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of an action for breach of a secret espionage contract, 
concluding that “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit  
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead  
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential,  
and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated”.  
The Totten rule was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Tenet v. Doe in 2005. 
The Court unambiguously decided that American jurisdiction courts  
are not competent to act in disputes on the performance of agreements 




 The legal bases for introducing evidential restrictions on the use  
of sensitive national security information in the civil process can be found 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland36. In the Polish legal system, 
freedom of information and the right to public information make  
up subjective public rights guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, secrets 
and lack of openness with reference to public information intrudes  
                                                   
34 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), available at: https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/92/105/case.html [last accessed: 24.10.2015]. 
35 “We reverse because this holding contravenes the longstanding rule, announced  
more than a century ago in Totten, prohibiting suits against the Government based  
on covert espionage agreements”, Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), available at: 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/544/1/opinion.html [last accessed: 
24.10.2015]; see also H.L. McPherson, Tenet v. Doe: Balancing National Security and Contracts  
to Spy, University of Hawaii Law Review 2005, vol. 28. 
36 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2.04.1997, Dz.U. [Polish Journal of Laws] 
No. 78, item 483, as amended. 
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into the sphere of constitutional rights and freedoms. The constitution also 
creates a standard of the right to public information and its potential 
restrictions. It is assumed on the grounds of the Polish constitutional 
solutions that the collision of interest protected by law, such as e.g. freedom 
and security will not lead in consequence to a full elimination of one  
of the values in conflict37. The general clause expressed in Article 31 § 3  
of the Constitution provides that any limitation of the exercise  
of constitutional freedoms and rights in a democratic state may be imposed 
only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state.  
The Constitution introduces the principle of proportionality and  
an exhaustive list of legitimate purposes, owing to which the access  
to information may be limited. Therefore, any limitation must remain 
within the scope defined by the Constitution and be proportionate  
to the purpose for which it was introduced. Article 61 of the Constitution 
grants to every citizen the right to obtain information on the activities  
of organs of public authority as well as persons discharging public 
functions. It specifies the limitations upon the right justified as possible 
solely to protect the freedoms and rights of other persons and economic 
subjects, public order, security, or important economic interests of the State.  
 The constitutional premises of a refusal to disclose public information 
determine the boundaries for the legislator in limiting access to such kinds 
of information38. One of the justifications for limiting access to public 
information is the need to protect classified information. In Poland,  
a modern system of classified information was established by statute  
in 1999. In 2011, a new legal act came into force. The Classified Information 
Protection Act of 5th August 2010 was aimed at regulating effectively  
                                                   
37 Compare: the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 20.03.2006, K 17/05, 
Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Decisions of Constitutional Tribunal] 2006, no. 3, 
item 30. 
38 A. Piskorz-Ryń, Weryfikacja zgodności polskich ograniczeń jawności z Konwencją z Tromsø 
[Compliance of the Polish Limitations of Access to Public Information with Tromsø Convention],  
[in:] G. Szpor, A. Gryszczyńska (eds), Jawność i jej ograniczenia, Tom VI Struktura tajemnic 
[Information Freedom and Its Limits, Vol. VI, Structure of Secrets], Warszawa: C.H. Beck 2014,  
p. 58; Freedom of Information Act of 6.09.2001 expounds on the right set out in Article 61  
of the Constitution by stating that anyone has the right to obtain immediately public 
information, including current data regarding public issues, without any requirement that 
the requester prove a legal or non-legal interest. The act also imposes an explicit obligation 
on the specified state authorities to disclose information. 
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the protection of classified information in both the domestic and 
international spheres. The law protects only that information whose 
unauthorized disclosure would be detrimental to the State’s interests,  
not any kind of private or organizational interests. By defining classified 
information, it has introduced a new standard, basing it on the extent  
of possible damage to the State’s interests. Classified information is marked 
at one of four levels in descending order. “Top secret” causes  
an “exceptionally grave harm” to the State’s legal interests in case  
of its unauthorized disclosure. It would threaten the independence, 
sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Poland, threaten the internal safety  
or constitutional order of Poland, threaten the foreign relations or activities 
of Poland, weaken Polish defence ability, or lead to the identification  
of intelligence officers or endanger their lives or the lives of protected-
identity witnesses. Unauthorized disclosure of information classified  
as “secret” causes “grave harm” to the State’s legal interests. “Confidential” 
causes “harm”; and “restricted” causes a deleterious effect on the ability  
of public organs or public organizational units to perform their duties39.  
 In the 1990s, Polish civil procedure law went through deep reforms, 
and ideological and political revaluations. The principle of objective  
truth lost the function of the fundamental civil procedure rule, setting  
out the aims and functions thereof40. Since that change, the aim  
of the process has been, similarly to that of Western European states41,  
the rendering of a lawful decision in a given case by the Court. The Court’s 
discovery and recognition of the facts also serves this purpose. Objective 
recognition of facts is a crucial value, but at the same time one of the many 
values necessary to be taken into consideration in the process. In some 
cases, searching for the objective truth may be considered useless because  
                                                   
39 A. Bodnar, I. Pacho, Polish Law on Right to Information and Classification, Analysis  
of Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, May 2011, available at: 
http://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-access/resources/publications/national-security-
expert-papers/Bodnar_PachoPolishlawonclassification.pdf [last accessed: 20.08.2015]. 
40 Compare K. Lubiński, Głos w dyskusji [Comment], [in:] T. Ereciński, K. Weitz (eds), 
Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego a Kodeks postępowania cywilnego  [The Case-law  
of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Code of Civil Procedure], Warszawa: LexisNexis 2010,  
p. 270.  
41 M. Taruffo, Prawda sądowa i powoływanie się na fakty w postępowaniu cywilnym [Judicial  
Truth and Invoking Facts in Civil Proceedings], Studia Prawnicze [Legal Papers] 1985, no. 3-4, 
pp. 255-267. 
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it does not serve the interests protected by law, set out by the substantive 
law42. 
 In spite of the mentioned changes, the legislator did not repeal  
all guarantees relating material truth. The Court still needs to watch  
over the correctness of the course of a process. The Court maintains  
the right to conduct the evidence necessary to resolve the case43.  
The Court’s role consists currently in encouraging the parties to file 
relevant allegations and to produce evidence to prove them44. 
 On the other hand, in some cases the court needs to make concessions 
in favor of formal truth. In the mid-1990s, the principle of an active court, 
characteristic of the socialist legal process was replaced by the principle  
of adversarial proceedings in the modern sense. The current Article 3  
of the Code of Civil Procedure is dedicated to the latter principle.  
It stipulates that “the parties and participants in proceedings are obliged  
to provide explanations as to the circumstances of the case and to submit 
evidence in accordance with good practice, and without concealing 
anything”. 
                                                   
42 The issue of recognition of the truth in civil process belongs to most of the frequently 
discussed problems. Compare: Z. Resich, Poznanie prawdy w procesie cywilnym [Recognition  
of the Truth in the Civil Process], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze 1958; M. Waligórski, 
Gwarancje wykrycia prawdy w procesie cywilnym [Guarantees of the Detection of Truth in the Civil 
Process], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1953, no. 8-9; O. Bogucki, Teoretyczne aspekty zasady 
prawdy materialnej w nowym modelu postępowania cywilnego [Theoretical Aspects of the Principle  
of Material Truth in the New Model of Civil Proceedings], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny  
i Socjologiczny [Journal of Law, Economics and Sociology] 2000, no. 1; T. Pietrzykowski,  
B. Wojciechowski, Równość, prawda i sprawiedliwość w procesie cywilnym. Rozważania  
na tle nowelizacji Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [Equality, Truth and Justice in Civil Process. 
Considerations on the Revision of the Code of Civil Procedure], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny  
i Socjologiczny [Journal of Law, Economics and Sociology] 2000, no. 1; K. Knoppek, Zmierzch 
zasady prawdy obiektywnej w procesie cywilnym [The End of the Principle of Objective Truth  
in the Civil Proces], Palestra [The Bar] 2005, no. 1; A. Jakubecki, Naczelne zasady postępowania 
cywilnego w świetle nowelizacji kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [Fundamental Principles of the Civil 
Procedure in the Light of the Novelisation of the Code of Civil Procedure], [in:] I. Ratusińska (ed.), 
Czterdziestolecie Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego. Zjazd Katedr Postępowania Cywilnego  
w Zakopanem (7-9.10.2005) [Forty Years of the Code of Civil Procedure. Meeting of Chairs of Civil 
Procedure in Zakopane (7-9.10.2005)], Kraków: Kantor Wydawniczy Zakamycze 2006. 
43 Article 232 of Polish Code of Civil Procedure: parties shall be obliged to present evidence 
in order to establish facts from which they derive legal consequences. The court may admit 
evidence which has not been presented by a party. 
44 T. Ereciński, Komentarz do art.3 Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [Article 3 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Commentary], Lex Omega 2012. 
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 The derogation from determining the truth in a process may  
be dictated by the protection of a public interest as well as of a justified 
individual interest. One of such values is keeping some information 
confidential45. The sphere of cognition is limited by the substantive law46. 
The Polish Code of Civil Procedure introduces evidential restrictions, 
among other things, with reference to the use of information of particular 
importance for the State. 
 Following the entry into force of the new Classified Information 
Protection Act, the code terminology related thereto has been unified.  
The most important provision from this point of view is Article 248 § 1  
of the Code of Civil Procedure. It constitutes the Polish equivalent  
of the American state secrets privilege. According to the article, “each person 
shall be obliged to present, following a court order, within a determined 
time limit and in a determined location, a document which is in his 
possession and which constitutes proof of a fact of vital importance  
for the adjudication of a case, unless that document contains  
classified information”. The obligation to present a document refers also  
to a document in the files of a organ of public authority, and of any other 
organ of State47. However, if it becomes apparent from the allegations  
of parties or from other circumstances of the case that the document 
contains such a secret, the Court shall not issue an order obliging  
it to be presented. 
 In the literature, the authors point to the vague wording  
of the provisions of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, as well as their own 
divergent views of the doctrine in this area, which are a consequence  
of the vagueness48. Current solutions are considered to be insufficient  
                                                   
45 J. Preussner-Zamorska, Zakres prawnie chronionej tajemnicy w postępowaniu cywilnym  
[The Scope of Legal Secrets in the Civil Proceedings], Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [Private Law 
Quarterly] 1998, no. 2, pp. 288, 294. 
46 Ibidem, p. 300. 
47 Article 248, K. Piasecki (ed.), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego Tom I, Komentarze  
do artykułów 1-366 [Article 248, Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. I, Commentaries to Articles 1-366], 
Warszawa: C.H. Beck 2010, p. 1338. 
48 M. Leciak, Tajemnica państwowa w zeznaniach świadka w polskim ustawodawstwie [State Secret 
in the Witness Testimony According to the Polish Law], Toruń: TNOiK 2007, p. 93. 
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and changing them, expanding them, and making them more detailed  
is suggested, just as is done in criminal proceedings law49. 
 Using the sensitive national security information in the process  
is linked with the issue of the openness of trials in a civil court, where such 
information would be used and there would be the possibility  
of questioning witnesses about the circumstances covered by the secret.  
In Polish law, the court is obliged ex officio to exclude the openness  
of the sitting, where the circumstances mentioned in Article 153 § 1  
of the Code of Civil Procedure occur, i.e. when “classified information 
could be revealed”. A public dissemination of information from a closed 
court trial is subject to a fine, the penalty of limitation of liberty  
or the penalty of deprivation of liberty of up to 2 years (Article 241 § 2  
of the Penal Code50).  
 According to Article 259 point 2 military personnel and civil servants 
who have not been released from the obligation to keep secret the classified 
information labelled as “confidential” or “restricted” may not act  
as witnesses, if their testimony could involve a violation of the obligation  
of confidentiality. This exclusion is independent of the will of the parties.  
It occurs ex lege and the court’s own motion is required to prevent such 
persons testifying. An exception applies if the military officials are released 
from secrecy. Military officials will mean both professional soldiers  
and others on whom such status has been conferred by law. The ban  
also includes former military officials51. In turn, the concept of “civil 
                                                   
49 In the Polish Code of Penal Procedure, among other things, the distinction between 
classified information with the “top secret” status and “secret information” from 
“confidential” and “restricted information” was introduced. It is exclusively an authorized 
superior body that may release from the higher category secrets, but the Court or Prosecutor 
may release from the obligation to maintain the secrecy of confidential lower category 
information – Article 179 and Article 180 of the Code of Penal Procedure; compare: J. Misztal-
Konecka, Informacje niejawne w postępowaniu cywilnym [Classified Information in Civil 
Proceedings], Przegląd Sądowy [Judicial Overview] 2012, no. 6, pp. 99-100. 
50 Act of 6.06.1997 Criminal Code, Dz.U. [Polish Journal of Laws] No. 88, item 553,  
as amended. 
51 Article 259, Piasecki (ed.), supra note 47, p. 1354.  
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servant” is synonymous with the term of “public officer” as defined  
in Article 115 § 13 of the Penal Code52. 
 The consideration of the issue of evidential restrictions in Polish 
procedural law requires the noting of a broader axiological and systematic 
context of law in which these restrictions function. Poland participates  
in European legal culture where freedom of information is regarded  
as one of the conditions for the functioning of a democratic State53.  
When interpreting the restrictions of freedom of information in Polish law, 
the participation of Poland in the European structures must shall be taken 
into account along with its being bound by international law  
and membership of the regional system of human rights protection within 
the Council of Europe. The Republic of Poland concluded also bilateral 
international agreements on the mutual protection of classified information 
with various countries, as well as NATO agreements on the protection  
of information from 1997 (ratified by Poland in 1999)54 and on cooperation 
in the field of atomic information from 1964 (ratified in the year 2000)55. 
 The minimum standards to which the members of the Council  
of Europe should adapt in terms of access to official documents are laid 
down by the Tromsø Convention opened for signature on 18 June 2009. 
Although it has not yet become an applicable law, it is testimony  
to the limits of compromise acceptable to all countries, participating  
in its drawing up within the Council of Europe56. It is also the closure  
and crowning of the discussion on the scope of the right of access  
to public information, which has been in progress in the environment  
of European lawyers for many years. Three soft law recommendations 
                                                   
52 K. Flaga-Gieruszyńska, Komentarz do art. 259 [Comment to Article 259], [in:]  
A. Zieliński (ed.), Komentarze Kodeksowe; Kodeks postępowania cywilnego [Comments to the Codes; 
Code of Civil Procedure], Warszawa: C.H. Beck 2014, p. 510. 
53 A. Gryszczyńska, Podstawy prawne ograniczeń jawności w Polsce [Legal Basis for Limiting  
the Freedom of Information in Poland], [in:] G. Szpor, A. Gryszczyńska (eds), Jawność i jej 
ograniczenia, Tom VI Struktura tajemnic [Information Freedom and Its Limits, Vol. VI, Structure  
of Secrets], Warszawa: C.H. Beck 2014, p. 1. 
54 By a Treaty between the Parties of NATO on the Protection of Information, Journal  
of Laws no. 64, sec. 740. 
55 By a Treaty between the Parties of NATO on the Cooperation on Atomic Information, 
Journal of Laws no. 143 sec. 1594. 
56 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents. 
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issued by the Council of Europe and dedicated to this subject, starting from 
197957 are proof of the importance of the issues in question. 
 According to the provisions of the Convention, each Party shall 
guarantee the right of everyone, without discrimination on any grounds,  
to have access, on request, to official documents held by public authorities. 
Article 3 introduces possible limitations to the right. They shall be set down 
precisely in law, be necessary in a democratic society, and be proportionate 
to the aim of protecting, e.g. national security, defence and international 
relations, and public safety. The notion of national security should be used 
with restraint. It should not be misused in order to protect information that 
might reveal a breach of human rights, corruption within public 
authorities, administrative errors, or information which is simply 
embarrassing for public officials or public authorities58. Access may  
be limited with the aim of protecting public safety, for example  
“by prohibiting the disclosure of documents concerning the security 
systems of buildings and communications”59. Referring to court 
proceedings, the Convention also accepts limitations of access in order  
to protect the equality of parties and the effective administration of justice. 
It ensures the equality of parties before domestic as well as international 
courts. Respecting the right to fair trial, the convention authorizes a public 
authority to refuse access to documents drawn up or received with respect 




 The legal solutions regarding access to public information adopted  
in the Polish Constitution are clearly modelled on European law and 
international human rights law. Our fundamental law established the right 
                                                   
57 Council of Europe Recommendation No. 854 (1979) of the Parliamentary Assembly  
on Access by the Public to Government Records and Freedom of Information; 
Recommendation No. R (81) 19 of the Committee of Ministers on the Access to Information 
Held by Public Authorities; Recommendation Rec(2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers  
to Member States on Access to Official Documents. 
58 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents 
(CETS No. 205). 
59 Ibidem, comment to Article 3, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph b.  
60 Ibidem, comment to Article 3, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph i.  
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to public information and restricted the ordinary legislator regarding  
its entitlement to limit this right. One example is the classification  
of information because of its importance to national security. The main 
legislation act governing the protection of classified information in Poland 
is the Classified Information Protection Act. In accordance with Article 4 
sec. 2 of this act, “the rules of exemption from the obligation to maintain 
the confidentiality of classified information and the treatment of case  
files containing classified information in proceedings before courts  
and other authorities shall be governed by separate laws”. Such a law  
in civil proceedings is the Code of Civil Procedure. The solutions adopted 
in the code raise many doubts. The wording of Article 248 § 1,  
and therefore of the equivalent of the American state secrets privilege,  
has not changed significantly since the adoption of the Code in 1964.  
This provision does not take into account the political transformations nor, 
in consequence, the enactment of a new constitution with the right  
to public information, the rule of law, and to a fair and public hearing 
before court. Although the refusal of access to the document caused by its 
containing classified information constitutes a restriction on a subjective 
right granted by the Constitution, the Polish law of civil procedure does not 
contain mechanisms for the court to control the legitimacy of such a refusal. 
There are no good solutions to balance the interests of the parties in such  
a situation. The proportionality principle is replaced by process 
automatism of a zero-one nature. As a consequence of the invoking  
of it by any person holding a document, the fact that it contains classified 
information results in an absolute prohibition of making the document 
available in the process. 
 Neither does the Code indicate who may apply for the exemption from 
secrecy of a witness and which entities are entitled to such exemption, what 
should guide the releasing authority, and whether this decision could  
be appealed against. Each of the identified deficiencies is a legal loophole  
in essence. Nor are there any regulations regarding covert interrogation 
records or the rules for access to the file of the case whose openness  
was excluded61. 
                                                   
61 Leciak, supra note 48, pp. 376-378. 
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 Polish doctrine has not undertaken to a sufficient extent the issue  
of restrictions on taking evidence from a document in a civil lawsuit  
in connection with the protection of classified information. The number  
of papers on this subject is very insignificant, compared to the vast 
literature dedicated to the issue of the use of the state secrets privilege  
in the USA. 
 Despite the fact that American democracy is characterized by a focus 
on openness and the accessibility of information, their right to information 
has never had such a legally binding and universal character  
as in European states. In the United States, the rights of citizens in this area 
are primarily the product of case law and doctrine. The law allows 
concealment of information. In a civil suit, the executive power can benefit 
from the state secrets privilege which, effectively raised, brings  
in consequence the exclusion of certain evidence from the proceedings.  
The rationale for such an understanding of secrecy and executive power 
privilege in the process stems from the principle of the separation  
of powers and the information autonomy of each government branch. 
 The relationship between the judiciary and the executive segments  
in the context of state secrets was explained in the El-Masri case. According 
to the American constitution, the courts are authorized to decide cases  
and controversies. But, as the court noted in reference to the judiciary,  
“we would be guilty of excess in our own right if we were to disregard 
settled legal principles in order to reach the merits of an executive action 
that would not otherwise be before us – especially when the challenged 
action pertains to military or foreign policy62”. 
 The time of the so-called war against terror was a period of particular 
activity of executive authorities in the field of state secrets privilege63.  
As one of the commentators said in the early years of the twenty first 
century, a shift from a society where information is distributed on the basis 
of the “right to know” to one where information is distributed on the basis 
                                                   
62 El-Masri v. United States, supra note 22. 
63 See also P. Aftergood, National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change, Social  
Research 2010, vol. 77, no. 3; L.K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, University  
of Pennsylvania Law Review 2010, vol. 159; P. Aftergood, Reducing Government  
Secrecy  Finding What Works, Yale Law & Policy Review 2009, vol. 27. 
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of the “need to know”64 began in the United States. Critics of that situation 
indicated that the rising rate of secrecy within an elected US government 
started undermining the legal, political, and cultural traditions of that 
government. The changing of the information policy introduced during  
the Presidency of Obama has given rise to a recognition that in recent years 
the United States has moved closer to European standards in terms  
of access to public information. 
 The task of the legal doctrine is the critical analysis of both changes  
in legal regulations as well as the treatment of secrets by the courts.  
In addition to the formal-dogmatic analysis, the discourse on disclosure 
exemptions in the United States is enriched by addressing the issue  
in terms of a dispute over the acceptable level of executive interference 
with civil rights, such as, in particular, the freedom of speech, the freedom 
of the press, or the right to a fair trial. A similar trend of considerations 
should be shared by Polish doctrine. Claims involving the state secrets 
privilege create a tension between two distinct public interests. One  
is preventing public harm that comes from the disclosure of certain 
documents, the other consists in preventing the frustration of justice65.  
                                                   
64 T. Gup, Nation of Secrets: the Threat to Democracy and the American Way of Life , New York: 
Doubleday 2007, p. 9. 
65 Huyck, supra note 30, p. 451. 
 
 
